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The Relative Informational Efficiency of Corporate Retail Bonds: Evidence from the 
London Stock Exchange  
 
Abstract 
I examine the relative informational efficiency of the London Stock Exchange’s newly launched 
Order book for Retail Bonds (ORB). I find that the daily returns for the stocks of the issuing firms 
lead the daily returns of the retail bonds born in the ORB. This finding also holds for pre-existing 
bonds that were transferred to the ORB from the LSE’s Main Market and for the bonds with 
different credit ratings, issue sizes, and maturity times. I also find that bonds have very limited 
predictive ability for stock returns. Overall, the results provide strong evidence that the underlying 
stock market is relatively more efficient than the ORB. Further, the relative informational 
inefficiency of the ORB implies profitable trading opportunities for private investors. 
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1. Introduction 
Because stocks and bonds are claims on the same corporate assets, the arrival of publicly available 
information that affects the market values of these assets should concurrently affect their returns. But, 
if one of the two markets is relatively more efficient than the other, then the returns of the more 
efficient market can reflect information faster than the returns of the less efficient market. Therefore, 
these returns have the power to predict the future returns of the security traded in the less efficient 
market. As a result, the activities of informed traders lead to a lead-lag relation for the returns of the 
two securities. 
The possible differences in the level of informational efficiency of the two markets could be 
due to the different types of investors and the different informational environments that prevail in the 
two markets. The bond market is typically dominated by sophisticated institutional investors who 
have better and faster access to relevant information than private investors who tend to prefer the 
stock market. Thus, institutional investors incorporate relevant information faster than private 
investors that implies the bond market should be more informationally efficient than the stock market. 
Then again, there are many more financial analysts that follow the stock rather than the bonds of a 
firm. Thus, more stock-related research is produced and disseminated to the buy-side investors, as 
compared to the bond-related research that is mainly limited to firms rated by credit rating agencies. 
Further, stock analysts tend to revise their recommendations about a firm more frequently compared 
to the rating agencies that follow the same firm. Hence, stock prices should incorporate relevant 
information faster than bond prices, and the stock market should be more informationally efficient 
compared to the bond market. Under both scenarios, a lead-lag relation between the returns of the 
two securities should be observed. Further, a growing body of literature finds that stock markets might 
not integrate all of the available information instantly (e.g., Hong et al., 2007; Hou, 2007). Under this 
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scenario, the lagging market has a limited ability to fully incorporate the information reflected in the 
leading market. Thus, it is possible that bonds might lead in incorporating a particular type of 
information, such as a change in the probability of default, and lag in incorporating another type of 
information, such as an increase in sales revenue. Further, in the presence of information asymmetries, 
informed traders tend to systematically trade in either the bond or the stock market because of 
differences in trading fees, mechanisms, liquidity, institutional constraints, marginal tax brackets, and 
insider-related legislation (i.e., disclosure requirements).   
In this paper, I investigate the relative informational efficiency of the recently launched 
electronic Order book for Retail Bonds (ORB) of the London Stock Exchange (LSE). According to 
the EU Prospectus Directive (2010) a retail bond is a bond that is traded in units of less than £50,000. 
To a large extent, the retail bond market can be thought of as the non-institutional part of the buy-
side. The ORB was launched on February 1, 2010, to satisfy the increasing demand of UK private 
investors for easy access to retail bond trading. Indeed, a survey by the Association of Private Client 
Investment Managers and Stockbrokers (APCIMS) reports that demand for corporate bonds by 
private investors has quintupled since 2008 (LSE, 2013). The intention of the ORB was also to grant 
UK small- and medium-sized firms direct access to an untapped segment of the debt market. The 
APCIMS estimates that in a few years the ORB is likely to attract an extra £20 billion per year of 
fresh investment to the UK corporate debt market. The importance of this new source of financing 
for small- and medium-sized firms and its relevance to the recovery of the UK economy is well 
highlighted in the Breedon Report that recommends, among other things, that the United Kingdom 
needs to “increase the UK retail investor appetite for corporate bonds” (DBIS, 2012a).1 In the current 
                                                            
1 The recommendations of the Breedon Report have been widely welcomed by the industry. For example, John Cridland, 
the Director-General of CBI, UK’s premium business lobbying group, said, “One of the CBI’s ideas was to open up the 
UK bond markets to mid-sized firms, so it’s great to see this report setting out how this can be done. To help stimulate 
demand for bonds issued by mid-sized businesses we need to develop a retail market, …” (CBI, 2012). 
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economic environment where interest rates have reached very low levels that offer private investors 
limited choices in fixed income investments, and firm financing is neither easily available nor cheap; 
the introduction of an informationally efficient secondary market for retail bonds might significantly 
help small- and medium-sized UK companies to raise the much needed financing not currently 
available from banks.2 
Despite the importance and the size of the bond markets, corporate bonds usually trade in a 
rather opaque environment with only a few market professionals that have access to information such 
as the prices at which dealers are willing to transact and the actual prices of completed bond trades. 
3,4 As a result, the literature on various aspects of the corporate bond markets is quite limited and 
rather inconclusive. On one hand, a number of studies find that stock returns lead bond returns and, 
therefore, the stock market is relatively more efficient than the bond market (e.g., Downing et al., 
2009; Kwan, 1996; Blume et al., 1991; Cornell and Green, 1991; Hong et al., 2012; Gebhardt et al., 
2005). On the other hand, Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002), Ronen and Zhou (2013), and Bittlingmayer 
and Moser (2014) show that no evidence exists that stock returns systematically lead bond returns, or 
that the stock market is more efficient that the bond market. According to Downing et al. (2009), 
Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002), and Alexander et al. (2000), these conflicting findings could be 
attributed to the opaque nature of the corporate bond market and to the complex relation between the 
returns of a firm’s stock and its publicly traded high yield debt that exhibits both similarities and 
                                                            
2 According to figures from the Bank of England, the growth rate of stock lending to nonfinancial UK businesses was -
5.2% (-£2.1 billion) in 2010, -2.1% (-£0.8 billion) in 2011, -3.7% (-£1.5 billion) in 2012, and -3.0% (-£1.1 billion) by the 
end of November 2013 (Bank of England, 2014).  
3 The global corporate bond market is enormous. According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS, 2013), the 
global corporate bond market’s outstanding amount at Q2 of 2013 was $45.65 trillion. This is about 87% the size of the 
global equity market and about 67% of the global GDP. The largest corporate bond market is by far the US market 
(46.39%, $21.18 trillion), followed by the UK (7.70%, $3.51 trillion), and the Japanese (7.61%, $3.47 trillion).  
4 As Blume et al. (1991) discuss, a published bond price might be an actual transaction price, a bid and ask average, or 
either a bid or an ask price. They show that the return calculated by using any of these four possible prices is upward 
biased, and the bias increases as the bid-ask spread widens; similar concerns are also raised by Sarig and Warga (1989) 
and Nunn et al. (1986). 
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differences. The motivation for my study is to examine for the first time how new information is 
incorporated into the bond prices of the newly launched ORB. Unlike existing bond markets, the ORB 
allows all market participants access to continuously posted bid and ask prices via live data feeds that 
therefore could help to minimize information asymmetries. This high level of transparency 
contributes to the motivation to investigate the ORB’s informational efficiency relative to the 
underlying stock market. 
The results on the relative informational efficiency of the ORB market have direct 
implications for investors, bond issuers, and regulators. For instance, if stocks lead bonds, then 
investors might buy (sell) a firm’s bond after observing an increase (decrease) in the firm’s stock 
price. The investors are also likely to face higher transaction costs in the less efficient market because 
of the greater variance in the pricing error (i.e., deviations of the market price from the ‘fair’ price). 
Consequently, traders might not trade as frequently or at such large volumes because of the high 
implicit costs (see, e.g., Edwards et al., 2007; Bessembinder et al., 2006; Goldstein et al., 2007). This 
is also of interest to the bond issuers because firms are likely to raise financing more easily and less 
expensively in an informationally efficient market. This is especially important for small- and 
medium-sized firms because corporate bonds typically have a maturity of between seven and ten 
years. This time frame provides these firms with enough time to grow because of the longer term 
financing compared to bank loans. Thus, the introduction of the ORB can potentially help these firms 
to decrease their dependence on bank borrowing and lower their cost of debt, which ultimately could 
benefit the British economy as a whole. However, if the ORB market is unappealing to private 
investors (e.g., an inefficient market), then firms might have to sell their bonds at a significant 
discount in order to tempt potential buyers. For regulators and supervisory bodies, the findings of this 
study can help them to adopt policies that could improve the efficiency of the ORB, making the UK 
retail bond market a level playing field for all market participants. This level field could lead to the 
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further development of the retail bond market and the better allocation of capital resources that 
eventually will benefit the UK firms and economy. 
I use a bivariate vector autoregression model to examine the lead-lag relation between the 
daily returns of the ORB corporate retail bond portfolios and the daily returns of the underlying stock 
portfolios. The use of bond portfolios helps to mitigate the problems related to non-synchronous data, 
stale quotes, and extreme differences in liquidity in the bonds in my sample that could affect the 
interpretation of the observed lead-lag relations. I also regress the daily returns of the retail bond 
portfolios on the daily returns of UK government bonds and the FTSE All Shares index to examine 
the sensitivity of the retail bond returns to interest rates and stock market movements. Finally, I assess 
the economic significance of my results for industry practitioners by examining whether the lead-lag 
relation between bond and stock returns represents profitable trading opportunities. In particular, I 
address the following questions: Is the informational efficiency of the ORB different to that of the 
underlying stock market? And do the empirical results have any economic significance for industry 
practitioners?  
I find that the daily stock returns lead the daily retail bond returns for the portfolios of bonds 
born in the ORB, the bonds that were transferred to the ORB from the LSE’s Main Market as well as 
for bonds of different credit quality, issue size, and time to maturity. I also find that the daily returns 
of the portfolios of bonds born in the ORB; the bonds that were transferred to the ORB from the Main 
Market; and of the high yield, not rated, and the middle maturity bonds are significantly related to the 
daily returns of the stock market. Overall, the empirical results indicate that the underlying stock 
market is relatively more efficient than the ORB in incorporating publicly available information. The 
relative informational inefficiency of the ORB together with its low level of transaction costs imply 
profitable trades on retail bonds for the private investors. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of 
the ORB market. Section 3 describes the data used in this study, and Section 4 describes the methods 
used and presents the empirical results. In Section 5, I investigate the economic significance of the 
empirical results; and in Section 6, I summarize and conclude the paper.  
 
2. The Order book for Retail Bonds of the London Stock Exchange  
The ORB is an electronic retail bond market that is based on the LSE Group’s highly successful 
Italian Mercato Obbligazionario Telematico (MOT) platform operated by Borsa Italiana.5 The ORB 
aims to enhance the depth and liquidity of the UK retail bond market. The tax treatment of the ORB 
bonds is also appealing to private investors because retail bonds are exempt from a stamp duty, while 
those bonds that mature in more than five years after their purchase can also be included in Individual 
Savings Accounts (ISAs) and Self Invested Personal Pensions (SIPPs). The new market is regulated 
by the European Union (EU), which requires a high level of disclosure and transparency, while the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) monitors and supervises trading. Before the introduction of the 
ORB, private investors could only invest in retail bonds by trading units in funds of bonds or by 
buying or selling on the Over-the-Counter (OTC) market any of the more than 10,000 bonds listed in 
the LSE’s Main Market; though most of these securities are not electronically tradable. However, for 
                                                            
5 There are not many organised retail bond markets globally. In addition to ORB and MOT, a well-known European retail 
bond market is Germany’s Mittelstand which was launched at the same time as ORB (i.e., February 2010). As Biais et al. 
(2006) discuss, retail bond investors typically access the bond market via various channels of financial intermediation, 
typically wealth managers and brokers, who then arrange a trade with a deal or market maker. At that level, retail bond 
trades are rather infrequent and this is the gap ORB attempts to fill. Further, there are several screen-based quote services 
that have been designed for retail trades. The most well-known is Bondscape (set up by HSBC and Barclays) which can 
be accessed by wealth managers and brokers but not by retail investors directly. A number of market makers support 
Bondscape, who post two way quotes for over 350 bonds. Other popular screen-based systems include the systems created 
by the Royal Bank of Canada and the Deutsche Bank.   
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private investors, trading for the exact retail bonds they wanted was rather difficult and expensive. 
Thus, arguably, the launch of the ORB has created a new asset class for private investors. 
The ORB is similar in design to equity trading platforms, and private investors can place limit, 
market, and iceberg orders via the 36 registered member participants at a flat execution cost. The 
trading starts with an opening auction from 08.00 to 08.45 followed by continuous electronic trading 
until the closure of the market at 16.30. The bonds eligible for trading on the ORB must be listed in 
the LSE’s Main Market, be eligible for settlement via CREST (i.e., UK’s settlement system), and 
have a denomination of less than £10,000. The standard settlement timetable for corporate retail bonds 
is T+3 and for government retail bonds is T+1. Eleven dedicated market makers are committed to 
providing sufficient levels of liquidity by continuously posting two way prices during the trading 
day.6 Similarly to equity trading, the ORB allows investors to trade in sizes as small as £1 for gilts 
and £1,000 for corporate bonds and to observe the price discovering process via third party live data 
feeds. The tick size for all ORB bonds is standardized at £0.01, admission fees range from £2,500 to 
£4,200 for international issuers and from £5,000 to £20,000 for UK issuers, and there are no annual 
maintenance fees.  
Although it is just over four years since the introduction of the ORB, its launch seems to have 
been a success. At the beginning, and in order to boost the development of the retail bond market, 
LSE transferred a number of selected retail bonds from its Main Market to ORB. However, since then 
the ORB market has successfully expanded and small- and medium-sized firms have since accessed 
the retail bond market. For example, initially only 59 gilts and corporate bonds were available for 
trading. But, by the end of January 2014, this figure had risen to 179 gilts and corporate, international, 
                                                            
6 The eleven market makers are: Barclays Bank, Canaccord Genuity, HSBC Bank, Jeffries International, Investec Bank, 
Loyds TSB Bank, Numis Securities, Peel Hunt, Shore Capital Stockbrokers, The Royal Bank of Scotland, and 
Winterflood Securities.   
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and supranational bonds. Issuers include some of the most well-known British household names like 
Tesco, British Telecom Group, National Grid, GlaxoSmithKline, Morgan Stanley, General Electric 
Capital, Enterprise Inns, and The Royal Bank of Scotland7. The European Investment Fund has issued 
four supranational bonds and the HSBC Bank plc has issued the first international bond in the ORB 
that is denominated in Chinese Renminbi. The issues are usually oversubscribed and close early. 
Further, only £240 million was raised in 2010 but this figure grew to £1.477 billion in 2011, £2.988 
billion in 2012, and £3.925 billion in 2013, with the total number of ORB dedicated issues reaching 
41 by the end of January 2014. Apparently the growth in the debt amount issued by firms in the ORB 
is in line with the shrink in bank lending to UK nonfinancial businesses (see footnote 4 for lending 
figures from the Bank of England). It seems, therefore, that the ORB can potentially play a vital role 
in the financing of small- and medium-sized firms. The total number of trades also increased from 
1,400 in August 2012 to over 8,000 in August 2013, while the average trade size decreased markedly 
from £289,000 in 2011 to £55,000 in 2013. The ORB born corporate bonds represent 38% of all 
corporate bonds on the ORB but they account for over 70% of all trading. Further, 77% of the ORB 
born bonds were issued by small- and medium-sized firms. This percentage clearly indicates that 
despite the inevitable slow start due to the challenges many new markets experience, retail bond 
investors are increasingly participating in the ORB market (Moretta, 2013). Encouraged by the early 
success of the ORB, Xavier Rolet, the LSE’s CEO, disclosed that the LSE is contemplating expanding 
the retail bond market to continental Europe to compete directly with Deutsche Börse and Euronext 
(Sunday Telegraph, 2012).  
                                                            
7 It may seem like a paradox that Large-Cap firms also issue retail bonds. However, this might be because firms want to 
diversify in terms of funding sources, provide the opportunity to the small shareholders of the firm to invest in the bonds 
of the firm, through their ISAs and SIPPs, and to promote the name of the firm to fund managers on roadshows. 
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As of January 2014, there is a total of 179 bonds available for trading on the ORB. These 
include 106 corporate bonds, 68 gilts, 4 supranational (i.e., issued by the European Investment Bank), 
and 1 international corporate bond. Of the 106 corporate bonds, 97 are fixed rate, 8 are variable rate, 
and 1 is an inflation-linked rate bond. Further, of the 68 gilts, 57 are fixed rate, 8 are variable rate, 
and 3 are inflation-linked rate bonds. There are also four perpetual corporate bonds and six perpetual 
gilts. In addition, of the 111 corporate, supranational, and international corporate bonds, 90 are senior 
and 21 are subordinated bonds. In total, there are 41 new bond issues of which 33 are fixed rate, 4 are 
variable rate, and 4 are inflation-linked rate issues. 
***Insert Table 1 about here*** 
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics of all of the ORB corporate bond issues and the 
bonds traded on the ORB. Panel A reveals that there are considerable differences in the size of the 
bond issues. For example, although the average bond issue is £95 million, the smallest ORB bond 
issue is £10 million and the largest is £350 million. The mean coupon rate is 4.779% and the minimum 
and maximum coupon rates are zero and 7.500% respectively.8 Further, there are considerable 
differences in the characteristics of all of the bonds such as the coupon, yield-to-maturity (YTM), 
duration, time remaining to maturity, and maturity (Panel B). For example, the minimum coupon rate 
is 0.041% and the maximum is 9.625%, while maturities range from 3 years to 55 years. The mean 
YTM is 3.370% but the minimum is -0.384%, and the maximum is 8.248%. The characteristics of 
the corporate bonds also vary significantly (Panel C). For example, the mean duration is 5.81 years, 
and the minimum and maximum values are 0.13 years and 18.32 years respectively. The mean 
maturity is 15.18 years but the maturities range from 4.38 to 35 years. There is also considerable 
                                                            
8 The minimum coupon rate of zero is offered by a 10-year £35 million inflation-linked issue by The Royal Bank of 
Scotland that pays 1.3 times any annual increase in the UK Retail Price Index (RPI).    
11 
 
variation in the characteristics of the ORB born corporate bonds (Panel D) and the pre-existing 
corporate bonds that were transferred to the ORB after its introduction from the Main Market (Panel 
E). For example, the YTM for the ORB born bonds is 4.651% while the YTM for the non-ORB born 
bonds is 3.541%. However, this is not surprising given that about 77% of the ORB born bonds were 
issued by Mid-Cap or smaller firms. For these firms, retail investors require a higher yield than bank 
deposits to be attracted to the retail bond market.  
Given the observed differences in the characteristics of the ORB bonds, the empirical analysis 
is conducted by stratifying the sample according to credit quality, issue size, and time to maturity, as 
well as distinguishing between ORB born and non-ORB born corporate bonds.  
 
3. Data and Sample 
3.1. ORB corporate bond portfolios 
My sample is based on the corporate retail bonds listed on the ORB and covers the time period of 
February 01, 2010, to February 01, 2014. The information on the coupon rate, YTM, duration, 
maturity, and the International Securities Identification Number (ISIN) codes was collected from 
LSE; the information about bond prices, credit ratings, and bid-ask spreads was collected from 
Thomson Reuters. I exclude from my analysis the bonds issued by firms not publicly traded: 
perpetual, supranational, and international bonds. I also exclude the bonds for which data of more 
than a year (i.e., 250 daily observations) are not available. The question of how to treat multiple bonds 
issued by the same firm is an important one. I follow Bessembinder et al. (2006) by forming a value-
12 
 
weighted portfolio of the multiple bonds issued by the same firm9. The portfolio’s characteristics I 
then consider to represent the characteristics of the debt issued for that particular firm. As a result the 
total number of bonds available for analysis decreases from 111 to 49.  
Further, given the differences in the characteristics of the ORB corporate retail bonds, a priori, 
the stratification of the sample according to the bonds’ credit quality, issue size, and time to maturity 
makes sense. Specifically, I follow the approach of Harris and Piwowar (2006) to allocate the bonds 
to three portfolios according to their credit rating. For that reason, I obtain the bonds’ credit ratings 
from Moody’s, Fitch, and Standard and Poor’s (S&P) at the end of the sample period.10 I then use the 
descriptions of the credit quality of the three agencies to assign each credit rating to a common 
numeric scale from 1, for the highest credit rating (i.e., AAA), to 24 for the lowest credit rating (i.e., 
in default). I then calculate the average credit rating across the three agencies, and I assign each bond 
to a credit rating. If a bond is only rated by two credit agencies, I use the lowest rating. I then allocate 
the bonds to the ‘Investment grade’ and the ‘High yield’ equally weighted portfolios. A significant 
number of retail bonds are not rated by any credit agency, and therefore I allocate them to a ‘Not 
rated’ portfolio. The ‘Investment grade’ portfolio contains 39 bonds with a credit rating of BBB and 
higher that account for 83.34% of the debt issued by the bonds in my sample, the ‘High yield’ portfolio 
                                                            
9 Bessembinder et al. (2006) discuss the three main approaches used to deal with the issue of firms with multiple bond 
issues. The first approach is to treat each bond as a separate observation (the Bond Level Approach). But, this approach 
is problematical because the assumption of independent data points is violated, and therefore the error terms in the VAR 
and regression models that I apply in Section 5 could be correlated for firms with multiple bonds. In addition, because 
large firms with high credit ratings usually issue multiple bonds, this approach might lead to the overrepresentation of 
large firms in my sample. The second approach is to choose a representative bond for each firm (the Representative Bond 
Approach) according to some criteria, which are not necessarily objective. The problem with this approach is that bonds 
issued by the same firm but with different characteristics tend to react differently to events that affect the firm’s value. 
Thus, the representative bond might not accurately capture the change in the value of the firm’s debt. The third approach 
treats the multiple bonds of a firm as a value-weighted portfolio (the Firm Level Approach). This approach has the benefit 
of eliminating the problem of dependent error terms in my models while it also accurately represents the value change in 
the firm’s debt. Bessembinder et al. (2006) find that value-weighted portfolio matching approaches are more powerful 
than equally weighted approaches. 
10 I also examine the credit ratings of the bonds at the beginning, middle, and end of the sample period. The number of 
bonds that changed ratings during this time period is very small and therefore, I reasonably assume that credit rating 
migrations do not significantly affect my results.   
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contains only two bonds with a credit rating lower than BBB that account for 4.49% of the debt, and 
the ‘Not rated’ portfolio contains eight bonds not rated by either Moody’s, Fitch, or S&P that accounts 
for 12.17% of the debt.  
I also classify the bonds into three different size categories: an issue size of less than £50 
million (Small), £50 to £150 million (Medium), or above £150 million (Large). This is an arbitrary 
choice but seems appropriate given the mean (£95.49 million), minimum (£10.00 million), and 
Maximum (£350.00 million) size values. I then form equally weighted portfolios. The Small bond 
portfolio contains ten bonds that account for 4.74% of the debt issued by the bonds in my sample, the 
Medium bond portfolio contains 23 bonds that account for 33.82% of the debt, and the Large bond 
portfolio contains 16 bonds that account for 61.44% of the debt. Further, I classify the bonds into 
three different equally weighted portfolios with respect to the time remaining to maturity. These 
include: 22 bonds with time remaining to maturity of less than 5 years (Near maturity) that account 
for 46.94% of the debt issued by the bonds in my sample, 21 bonds with time remaining to maturity 
between 5 and 15 years (Middle maturity) that account for 31.42% of the debt, and 6 bonds with time 
remaining to maturity of more than 15 years (Far from maturity) that account for 21.64% of the debt. 
This is also an arbitrary choice but seems appropriate given the mean (17.6 years), minimum (3.0 
years), and Maximum (55.0 years) time to maturity values. Finally, I group the bonds according to 
whether they were issued in ORB (ORB born) or transferred to the ORB from the LSE’s Main Market 
(Non-ORB born), and for the respective equally weighted portfolios. Table 2 displays the summary 
statistics for the ORB corporate bond portfolios in my sample.          
***Insert Table 2 around here*** 
The table shows noteworthy differences in the number of bonds in each portfolio. For 
example, the Non-ORB born bonds are over two times the ORB born bonds, there are only 2 High 
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yield bonds compared to 39 Investment grade bonds, and only 6 bonds in my sample mature in more 
than 15 years. The table also reveals that, on average, the ORB born bonds offer a considerably lower 
coupon (5.739%) compared to the Non-ORB bonds (6.190%) that indicates that firms might raise 
financing more cheaply by issuing debt in the ORB market. The average yield of the ORB born bonds 
(4.339%) is also considerably higher, almost 100 basis points, than the yield offered by the Non-ORB 
bonds (3.341%). Despite these differences, the bid-ask spread is the same for the Non-ORB born and 
the ORB born bonds. Unsurprisingly, on average, the High yield bonds offer a considerably higher 
coupon (6.313%) compared to both the Investment grade bonds (5.865%) and the Not rated bonds 
(5.481%). The yields offered by the three bond portfolios are also considerably different with the 
High yield bonds offering the highest yield in order to tempt potential buyers. However, the 
transaction costs for bonds with lower credit ratings tends to be considerably higher than those for the 
bonds with higher credit ratings. Specifically, the average bid-ask spread for the High yield bonds is 
1.60% compared to 0.70% for Investment grade bonds. The differences in coupon, yield, bid-ask 
spread, as well as the other characteristics of the bonds are noticeably smaller when the bonds are 
categorized according to their issue size. Further, Table 2 also indicates that bonds that are at least 15 
years from maturity offer almost twice the yield of those that are due to mature in less than five years. 
However, the bid-ask spread for the Near maturity bonds is 0.54% while the bid-ask spread for the 
Far from maturity bonds is considerably higher at 1.18% 
3.2. Associated stock portfolios 
I use the ISIN to match the ORB retail bonds with the stocks of the issuing firms. Table 3 contains 
information about the market capitalization, the Altman’s z-score, and the total liabilities over the 
total assets ratio of the associated equally weighted equity portfolios.   
***Insert Table 3 around here*** 
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Table 3 shows that the average stock market capitalization varies from £36.7 billion for firms 
that have not initially issued their bonds in the ORB (but their bonds pre-existed and were transferred 
to the ORB from the Main Market) to £9.6 billion for firms that issued their bonds directly in the 
ORB. There is a considerable difference in the Altman’s z-score (Altman, 1968), a measure of 
financial distress, for firms with Non-ORB born bonds (2.09) and the firms with ORB born bonds 
(1.44); yet, the total liabilities over the total assets ratio does not indicate any significant leverage 
difference. The same ratio, however, indicates that the firms that issue bonds with a low credit rating 
or bonds that are not rated (i.e., High yield and Not rated bond portfolios) tend to be more leveraged 
than the firms that issue bonds with a higher credit rating (i.e., Investment grade). The Altman’s z-
score indicates that firms that issue high yield bonds tend to have a higher probability of bankruptcy 
compared to the firms that issue investment grade bonds. However, this is not true for firms that issue 
non-rated bonds. Table 3 also reveals considerable difference in the average market capitalization of 
the firms that issue bonds of small and medium size (i.e., £11.1 and £16.9 billion) compared to the 
firms that issue large bonds (£53.7 billion). Notably, there is also a higher probability of bankruptcy 
for firms that issue small bonds as indicated by the low Altman’s z-score. The differences in the 
characteristics of the firms that issue bonds with different maturity times are less significant. 
3.3. Bond and stock portfolio returns 
The data that I use in my analysis consists of the daily returns11 of the retail corporate bonds on the 
ORB and the daily returns of the underlying stocks during the 4-year time period from February 01, 
2010 (i.e., the date ORB was launched) to February 01, 2014. The daily prices, adjusted for coupon 
payments, of the ORB corporate retail bonds and the stock prices of the issuing firms were collected 
                                                            
11 Bessembinder et al. (2006) report that using daily bond data significantly increases the power of statistical tests used to 
detect abnormal bond returns relative to lower frequency data. Further, the use of higher frequency data can lead to non-
trading effects because of infrequent transactions for the individual bonds.  
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from Thomson Reuters. For firms that issued multiple bonds, I value-weight their percentage price 
changes to derive the return on their publicly traded debt.  
Table 4 contains the descriptive statistics for the daily returns of the bond and the stock equally 
weighted portfolios. The bond portfolios tend to exhibit small daily returns with the exception of the 
ORB born, High yield, Middle maturity and Far from maturity bond portfolios, while the stock 
portfolios have significantly higher daily returns. However, the stock portfolios have considerably 
higher standard deviations as compared to their associated bond portfolios. Notably, the risk increases 
as the credit quality of the portfolios decreases and as the time remaining to maturity increases. The 
correlation coefficients between the daily returns of the bond and the stock portfolios are mostly 
negative and rather moderate, and only for the High yield portfolio is statistically indistinguishable 
from zero. Noticeable is also that the daily returns of the bond portfolios have a very low correlation 
with the daily returns of the 3-month UK government bond, implying that the ORB traded retail bonds 
are not significantly affected by interest rate movements.   
***Insert Table 4 around here*** 
4. Methodology and Empirical Results 
4.1 Examining the relative informational efficiency of the ORB market 
In order to examine the lead-lag relation between the ORB bonds and the issuing firm’s stock returns 
I assume a general structure for the relation between the bond and stock returns given by the following 
bivariate vector autoregressive (VAR) system: 
ܴ௧ ൌ ܿ ൅෍ܾ௜ܴ஻,௧ି௜ ൅෍ݏ௜ܴௌ,௧ି௜ ൅ ߝ௧௅௜ୀଵ௅௜ୀଵ  (1)
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where ܴ௧ is the variable set ൣܴ஻,௧ , ܴௌ,௧൧′, ܴ஻,௧ is the daily return on a bond portfolio at time t, and ܴௌ,௧ 
is the daily return on the associated stock portfolio at time t. The c is the intercept term, ܾ௜ and ݏ௜ are 
the coefficient matrices to be estimated, and ߝ௧  is the error term. The dynamics of how information 
is embedded into the bond and stock markets is examined by including the lagging terms in the 
model12. By including the lagged terms I minimize the risk of obtaining a spurious relation due to 
stale quotes or infrequent update of prices. The lag length L is determined on the basis of the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC). At firm level, in most cases, the AIC indicates a maximum lag length of 
order five for the daily retail bond returns and stock returns. Further, at portfolio level, in all cases, 
the AIC indicates a maximum lag length of order five for the daily returns of the bond and stock 
portfolios. Therefore the order of lags in the bivariate VAR system is set equal to five. It should be 
noted that Downing et al. (2009) also use a lag length equal to five for daily data and report that their 
findings are not sensitive to changes in lag lengths; Hotchkiss and Ronen’s (2002) findings are 
similar. For robustness, I also use different lag lengths (i.e., three to seven) and my empirical results 
are insensitive to the number of lags used.13    
The null hypothesis states that the ORB bond market and the associated stock market have 
equal information efficiency. Therefore, if the retail bonds and the associated stocks simultaneously 
                                                            
12 The direction of the lead-lag relation is determined by the type of information released over time. Information on an 
increase in the firm’s future cash flows should lead to an increase in the stock’s price. At the same time, the firm’s bonds 
should also increase in value because they are claims on the firm’s cash flows and their default risk decreases. Thus, a 
positive correlation should exist between the firm’s bond and stock returns. On the other hand, the arrival of information 
about a risky project with a potentially high return increases the default risk of the firm’s bonds and leads to a lower debt 
value. But, the value of the stock now increases because of the potential to reap a high return. Thus, a negative correlation 
should exist between the firm’s stock and bond returns. However, these two possible influences on the stock and the bond 
returns are not mutually exclusive. Thus, the signs of the estimated coefficients of the lagged stock returns in my VAR 
model represent the net effect of these two possibilities and cannot be safely interpreted. 
13 I test for stationarity in the daily returns of the two dependent variables, ܴ஻,௧ and ܴௌ,௧, using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller, and the Phillips-Perron tests (Dickey and Fuller, 1979; Phillips and Perron, 1988). The null hypothesis of non-
stationarity is rejected by both tests for the daily time series of all the bond and stock portfolios at the 1% significance 
level. Further, the Johansen’s cointegration test (Johansen, 1991) rejects the null hypothesis that the retail bond market 
and the underlying stock market are cointegrated for the time period I examine. Thus, I use the VAR system instead of a 
Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) system in my analysis. In the interest of brevity, the results of these preliminary 
tests are not included in the paper.  
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incorporate publicly available information, then the coefficients of all of the lagged cross-market 
returns should be statistically equal to zero. To test the hypothesis that stock returns do not cause the 
retail bond returns, I use the Granger (1969) causality test statistic which is the F-statistic of the null 
hypothesis that ܪ଴ ൌ ሾܾ௜ሿ ൌ Ͳ, for all i. Likewise, to test the hypothesis that the retail bond returns 
do not cause the stock returns I conduct an F-test of the null ܪ଴ ൌ ሾݏ௜ሿ ൌ Ͳ, for all i. The Granger 
causality test can determine whether stock (bond) returns are important in explaining bond (stock) 
returns. I use ordinary least squares to estimate the VAR system, and I report the results in Table 5. 
In general, the results strongly indicate that the lagged stock returns have predictive power for the 
bond returns. For example, with the exemption of the Not rated bond portfolio, there are many 
statistically significant coefficients for the lagged stock returns that help to explain the bond returns. 
Further, the Granger test rejects the null hypothesis that the lagged stock returns do not affect the 
bond returns for all but the Not rated bond portfolios. Further, there is weak evidence for only the All 
ORB and Large issue bond portfolios that the lagged bond returns lead the stock returns. Thus, my 
results provide strong evidence of a significant lead-lag relation between the returns of the retail bonds 
and the stock returns of the issuing firms. This lead-lag relation clearly indicates that the stock market 
is relatively more informationally efficient than the retail bond market. However, it should also be 
noted that the detected lead-lag relation is not clearly a causal one, and therefore it might be regarded 
as a joint reaction to common risk factors.    
***Insert Table 5 around here*** 
My results are different from the results in Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) who find that the 
informational efficiency of high yield corporate bonds is similar to that of the underlying stocks, and 
Ronen and Zhou (2013) who find that bond and stock markets are equally informationally efficient 
when liquidity and institutional features are taken into account. Further, my results are different to 
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Bittlingmayer and Moser (2014) who show that no evidence exists that stock returns systematically 
lead bond returns, or that the stock market is more efficient that the bond market. My results are closer 
to the results of Hong et al. (2012), Gebhardt et al. (2005), Downing et al. (2009), and Kwan (1996) 
who find that the stock market is relatively more efficient than the bond market. Downing et al. (2009) 
and Kwan (1996) also report that this higher informational efficiency varies with respect to the credit 
quality of the bonds. However, my findings do not considerably vary with the credit quality, the issue 
size, and the time remaining to maturity of the bonds, or even with whether the bonds were issued in 
the ORB or were transferred to the ORB from the LSE’s Main Market. Downing et al. (2009) note 
that the difference in their results and the results of Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) might be because of 
significant differences in the costs of bond transactions during the time period these two studies cover. 
This is because in a bond market with high transaction costs, information that induces trading in the 
stocks might not be of a sufficient magnitude to trigger trading in the firms’ bonds. However, in the 
case of the ORB, the transaction costs are relatively low which implies that the arrival of information 
that is significant enough to trigger trading in the stock of the firm should also be of significant 
magnitude to trigger trading in the bonds of the issuing firm. Thus, the higher relative informational 
efficiency of the stock market over the ORB market cannot be explained on the basis of the significant 
differences in the cost of the stock and bond transactions.  
A likely explanation might be the greater depth and liquidity of the stock market compared to 
the retail bond market. The trading culture of the more sophisticated institutional investors is 
typically, heavily weighted towards the stock market and the wholesale bond market. This is because 
more attention is paid to the stocks and the wholesale credit-rated bonds compared to the retail bonds 
of the same firm. For example, there are many more stock analysts than bond analysts; and stock 
analysis is widely disseminated to the buy-side of the market, while an analysis on bonds is 
predominantly limited to the bonds covered by credit agencies. These rating agencies do not revise 
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their ratings of bonds as frequently as stock analysts revise their analyses about the stocks of the same 
firms. In addition, stocks are also more actively traded than corporate bonds, which are often held till 
maturity when they fall into the hands of the big financial institutions. Thus, on the arrival of new 
information, the stock and the large debt issues of a firm attract most of the trading interest of the 
institutional investors mainly due to the depth and liquidity of the stock market. Therefore, it is 
possible that the smaller and less sophisticated private investors trade in the retail bond market on the 
basis of the same information, but with a time lag. Under this scenario, stock prices should incorporate 
public information faster than the retail bonds. 
4.2 Examining the sensitivity of results to interest rate, systematic and firm-specific risk 
The investment grade bonds usually have quite stable future cash flows and therefore they generally 
are more sensitive to changes in interest rates and less correlated with stock returns. On the other 
hand, the future cash flows of lower quality bonds, which are more likely to default, are more sensitive 
to information about the value of the issuing firm’s corporate assets and less sensitive to changes in 
interest rates. Further, the high yield bonds usually have higher coupon rates than investment grade 
bonds that implies shorter durations and less sensitivity to interest rates. For example, the average 
coupon rate and the duration for the High yield bond portfolio are 6.31% and 4.71 years respectively, 
compared with 5.86% and 5.33 years for the Investment grade bond portfolio.  
In order to further examine the lead-lag relation documented previously, I examine the 
sensitivity of the ORB retail bond returns to market-wide and interest rate risks by estimating the 
return generating process suggested by Cornel and Green (1991). For that reason, I regress the daily 
returns of the ORB bond portfolios on the lagged daily returns of the bond portfolios, on the daily 
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returns of default-free14 securities, on the daily returns of the FTSE All Shares index, and on the 
lagged daily returns of the associated stock portfolios. Specifically, I assume the following return 
generating process:  
ܴ஻,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅෍ߚ஻,௜ܴ஻,௧ି௜ ൅෍ߚ்,௜்ܴ,௧ି௜ ൅෍ߚி்ௌா,௜ܴி்ௌா,௧ି௜ ൅෍ߚௌ,௜ܴௌ,௧ି௜ ൅ ߝ௧௅௜ୀ଴௅௜ୀ଴௅௜ୀ଴௅௜ୀଵ  (2)
where ܴ஻,௧ is the daily return on a bond portfolio at time t, ்ܴ,௧ି௜ is the contemporaneous and lagged 
daily return of a UK government Treasury note of the closest matching maturity to the maturity of 
the bond portfolio, ܴி்ௌா,௧ି௜ is the contemporaneous and lagged daily return on the FTSE All Shares 
index, ܴௌ,௧ି௜ is the contemporaneous and lagged daily return of the associated stock portfolio, ߙ is 
the intercept term, and ߝ௧ is the error term. The coefficient ߚ்,௜ captures the sensitivity of the bond 
portfolio’s daily returns to changes in the rate of the default-free security with similar maturity, the 
coefficient ߚி்ௌா,௜ captures the sensitivity of the bond portfolio’s daily returns to the stock market’s 
returns, and the coefficient ߚௌ,௜ captures the sensitivity of the bond portfolio’s daily returns to the 
returns of the associated stock portfolios.15 The inclusion of the lagged terms allows me to account 
for the autocorrelation in the return structures of the bonds, default-free securities, market portfolio, 
and the associated stocks. 
***Insert Table 6 around here*** 
Table 6 displays the estimated summary statistics. I report only the sum of the estimated 
coefficients and not the individual coefficients because their interpretation is not meaningful in the 
                                                            
14 I use UK Treasury notes with different maturities. In their study, Downing et al. (2009) use the 5-year US Treasury 
note because it is the most heavily traded Treasury note, but they also report that their findings are insensitive to the 
maturity of the Treasury note used. Kwan (1996) matches bonds with risk-free interest rates by interpolation of the yields 
of Treasury bills with constant maturity, while Blume et al. (1991) construct risk-free bond prices by calculating the price 
of a portfolio of government bonds that closely matches the cash flows of the bonds.  
15 In the estimation of the coefficients, I use Generalized Method of Moments (Hansen, 1982) to take into account the 
problems related to the possible presence of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in the error terms. 
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context of my study. Unsurprisingly, for all of the bond portfolios, the estimated intercept coefficients 
are statistically indistinguishable from zero. The results show that for the All ORB, Non-ORB born, 
ORB born, High yield, Not rated, and Middle maturity bond portfolios, the sums of the estimated 
coefficients for the FTSE All Shares, ߚி்ௌா , are statistically significant; but the sums of the estimated 
coefficients for the underlying stock portfolios, ߚ௦, are significant only for the All ORB, Non-ORB, 
and Middle maturity bond portfolios. Thus, the daily returns of the All ORB, Non-ORB born, ORB 
born, High yield, Not rated, and Middle maturity bond portfolios are significantly related to the 
systematic risk but not to the firm-specific risk. My results partially agree with the results of Hotchkiss 
and Ronen (2002) who report findings for a sample of 20 high yield US corporate bonds. However, 
contrary to their results, the sums of the estimated coefficients for the returns of the FTSE All Shares 
are negative for all but the ORB born, High yield, and the Small issue bond portfolios. But, the 
negative signs of the sums of the estimated coefficients for the returns of the FTSE All Shares cannot 
be safely interpreted because they represent the net effect of the coefficients estimated over five time 
lags.16 Interestingly, the daily returns of both the Non-ORB born and the ORB born bond portfolios 
are significantly related to the daily returns of the FTSE All Shares index but only the daily returns 
of the Non-ORB born bond portfolio are significantly related to the daily returns of the underlying 
stock portfolios. Further, the estimated regression indicates that the sensitivities of the daily bond 
returns to interest rate movements are insignificant for all of the ORB bond portfolios. The results 
indicate that the daily interest rate movements do not have significant predictive power for the daily 
returns of the bond portfolios.  
                                                            
16 In case this negative relation is true, it might be unexpected given that stocks and bonds tend to exhibit a modest positive 
correlation in the long run. However, it is well documented that, occasionally, this relation can be negative and persistent, 
especially during periods of high market uncertainty (Fleming et al., 2003; Hartmann et al., 2001).   
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My results are different than the previous results reported in the literature for the US corporate 
bond market. For example, Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) regress the daily returns of the high yield 
bonds on the daily returns of the Lehman Intermediate Government Bond index and the S&P 500 
index. They report coefficients of 0.580 and 0.490 respectively. Downing et al. (2009) regress the 
daily returns of AAA and junk rated bond portfolios on the 5-year Treasury note and the S&P 500 
index returns. They report coefficients of 0.324 and -0.021, respectively, for the AAA rated portfolio, 
and 0.028 and 0.109, respectively, for the junk rated portfolio. Similar results are reported by Blume 
et al. (1991) and Cornell and Green (1991). The possible explanations for the differences in my results 
include the different characteristics of the private investor-based ORB bond market and the 
institutional investor-based US bond markets that are covered in the studies of Hotchkiss and Ronen 
(2002), and Downing et al. (2009). Further, the differences in results might be because of differences 
in the sample size of the bonds, the different time periods covered, and the different data types (i.e., 
bond portfolios versus individual bonds). Although the results are interesting, they should be 
interpreted with caution. Specifically, the High yield bond portfolio contains only two bonds and 
therefore might not be representative of the high yield sector of the ORB. In addition, the analysis 
uses daily returns that are determined by the FTSE All Shares index level and the bonds and stocks 
prices at the end of the day. Thus, if a bond only trades early in the day, then the associated stock and 
the FTSE All Shares index returns are likely to incorporate more recent information than the bond 
return.    
 
5. Economic Significance of Results 
I assess the economic significance of the lead-lag relation between the ORB bonds and the associated 
stocks by forming bond portfolios based on the behaviour of the past returns of the individual stocks. 
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Similar to Downing et al. (2009) and Lo and MacKinlay (1990), for each ORB bond portfolio, I 
construct a trading strategy by investing the fraction ݓ௕೔,௧  in bond bi: 
ݓ௕೔,௧ ൌ ͳܰ ൫ܴ௦೔,௧ିଵ െ ܴ௠,௧ିଵ൯ (3)
where N is the number of stocks in the stock portfolio that corresponds to a particular bond portfolio, ܴ௦೔,௧ିଵ is the daily return on the stock of firm si at time t-1, and ܴ௠,௧ିଵ is the daily return on the stock 
portfolio at time t-1. This zero-net investment trading strategy implies that I go long (short) on the 
bond whose underlying stock has achieved above (below) average returns in the previous period. I 
rebalance the resulting portfolio periodically (i.e., every day, week, and month), and I also calculate 
the cumulative return from February 1, 2011, to February 1, 2014 (I reserve the period February 1, 
2010, to January 31, 2011, in order to calculate the daily return of the stock portfolio). If the lead-lag 
relation between the stocks and bonds is economically significant without including the trading costs, 
then the formed portfolio of bonds should lead to an excess return.  
***Insert Table 7 around here*** 
The results in Table 7 show that for all of the holding periods, the average return is close to 
zero for all of the bond portfolios. However, the cumulative return is positive for all of the bond 
portfolios and holding periods. Specifically, the highest cumulative returns are provided by the bonds 
that are contained in the ORB born, High yield, Not rated, Small issue, and the Far from maturity 
bond portfolios. For example, when the bond portfolios are held for one week, the cumulative returns 
for the ORB born, High yield, Not rated, Small issue, and Far from maturity categories are 2.642%, 
4.678%, 6.213%, 6.866%, and 4.798% respectively. In general, the longer the bond portfolio is held, 
the larger the total return is. For example, for a holding period of one day, the cumulative return is 
3.231% in the Not rated category, but for one week and one month the cumulative returns increase to 
6.213% and 7.911% respectively. The profitability of this strategy ultimately depends on the cost of 
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the bond transactions. In most corporate bond markets, transaction costs tend to be considerable and 
thus, any potential trading profit is likely to be eliminated in the long run.17 However, the ORB is a 
market with low transaction costs that implies that private investors are likely to be able to exploit the 
lead-lag relation between the retail bonds and the stocks of the issuing firms. 
  
6. Conclusion 
I study the relative informational efficiency of the corporate retail bonds available for trading in the 
recently launched Order book for Retail Bonds in the London Stock Exchange. Although the ORB is 
a recent development, its launch has been a success among investors and issuers in terms of providing 
depth and liquidity to a market that previously, retail investors and firms could not access properly. 
This study contributes to the literature by showing how the arrival of publicly available information 
is factored into the prices of retail bonds and the issuing firms’ stocks. I use daily returns for portfolios 
of bonds born in the ORB; pre-existing bonds that were transferred to the ORB from the LSE’s Main 
Market; as well as for bonds of different credit quality, issue size, and time to maturity to examine 
the relative informational efficiency of retail bonds and stocks issued by the same firms. Specifically, 
I use a bivariate VAR system to investigate the lead-lag relation between the returns of the bonds and 
those of the issuing firms’ stocks.  
My results establish a significant lead-lag relation between the daily returns of the underlying 
stocks and the retail bonds, indicating that the stock market is more efficient relative to the retail bond 
market in incorporating common information. My findings do not vary with respect to the credit 
quality, the issue size, and the time remaining to maturity of the bonds, or even with respect to whether 
                                                            
17 Edwards et al. (2007) report average round-trip transaction costs of about 124 and 48 basis points for small (i.e., 
$20,000) and large transactions (i.e., $200,000), respectively, in the US OTC corporate bond market (similar results are 
reported in the literature by Goldstein et al., 2006; Hong and Warga, 2000; Harris and Piwowar, 2006). 
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the bonds were issued in the ORB or were transferred to the ORB from the LSE’s Main Market. In 
addition, given the low cost of order execution, the cost of transactions is not a satisfactory 
explanation for the relative inefficiency of the ORB. Instead, the possibility exists that with the arrival 
of publicly available information, private investors trade in the ORB with a time lag mainly because 
of the depth and liquidity of the stock market. I also show that it is possible to devise economically 
significant speculative trades based on the lead-lag relation between stocks and bonds. Although, 
profitability ultimately depends on the cost of the bond transactions, the ORB is a market with low 
transaction costs that implies that private investors can likely exploit the lead-lag relation between the 
retail bonds and the stocks of the issuing firms.  
Although the overall success of the ORB should be assessed over the course of many years, 
this study represents an important first step forward in understanding the relative informational 
efficiency of this retail corporate bond market. Although it might be interesting to examine additional 
important characteristics of the ORB, like the market’s quality and cost effectiveness, such an analysis 
is not currently possible due to the unavailability of appropriate data. However, if appropriate data 
becomes available, examining additional important properties of the ORB market would be a natural 
extension of this study. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the ORB bonds, characteristics, and issues  
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for the ORB bond issues and all bonds, corporate bonds, ORB 
born bonds, and non-ORB born bonds listed on the ORB at the end of January 2014. In total there are 
41 new bond issues and 6 subsequent taps of existing ORB issues. Of the 41 new bond issues, 33 are 
fixed rate, 4 are variable rate, and 4 are inflation-linked rate issues. In addition to the new issues, a 
significant number of bonds were transferred from the LSE’s Main Market to the ORB. In total, there 
are 179 bonds trading on the ORB that include 106 corporate bonds, 68 gilts, 4 supranational bonds, 
and 1 international bond. Of the 68 gilts, 57 are fixed, 8 are variable, and 3 are inflation-linked rate 
bonds. Further, 97 corporate bonds are fixed, 8 are variable, and 1 is inflation-linked rate bonds. There 
are also 6 perpetual gilts and 4 perpetual corporate bonds that are excluded from the calculations of 
‘Duration’, ‘Years to maturity’, and ‘Maturity’. The calculations of ‘Duration’, ‘Years to maturity’, 
and ‘Maturity’ refer to the end of January 2014. Of the 111 corporate, supranational, and international 
bonds, 90 are senior and 21 subordinated bonds. The term ‘Senior’ describes bonds that have priority 
over ‘Subordinated’ bonds in the case of a bankruptcy. ‘s’ is the total number of bond issues in the 
ORB, ‘N’ is the total number of bonds on ORB, ‘n’ is the total number of corporate bonds on ORB, 
‘m’ is the total number of ORB born corporate bonds, and ‘p’ is the total number of non-ORB born 
corporate bonds (i.e., those bonds transferred from LSE’s Main Market to ORB). Further, ‘St.Dev.’ 
denotes the standard deviation, ‘YTM’ is the Yield-to-Maturity of the bonds, and ‘Min’ and ‘Max’ 
denote the minimum and maximum values respectively.  
* The minimum coupon rate of zero is offered by a corporate bond issued by The Royal Bank of 
Scotland that pays 1.3 times any annual increase in the UK Retail Price Index. 
** The four supranational bonds were issued by the European Investment Bank, and the one 
international bond was issued by HSBC Bank plc and is the first and only bond in the ORB 
denominated in a foreign currency (i.e., Chinese Renminbi). 
Data source: London Stock Exchange.  
Panel A: Issue characteristics (33 fixed rate, 4 variable rate, and 4 inflation linked rate) 
Issue sample (s=41) Mean Median St.Dev  Min Max 
Size (£mil) 95.49 75.00 76.86 10.00 350.00 
Coupon (%) 4.779 5.375 1.889 0.000* 7.500 
Panel B: All bonds characteristics (106 corporate, 68 gilts, 4 supranational, and 1 international 
corporate bond**) 
Total sample (N=179) Mean Median St.Dev Min Max 
Coupon (%) 5.201 5.625 1.944 0.041 9.625 
YTM (%) 3.370 3.446 1.555 0.384 8.248 
Duration (years) 7.43 5.20 6.10 0.09 24.83
Years to maturity (years) 9.56 6.15 9.54 0.09 54.46
Maturity (years) 17.62 15.00 11.19 3.00 55.08 
Panel C: Corporate bonds characteristics (106 corporate, 4 supranational, and 1 international 
corporate bond) 
Total sample (n=111) Mean Median St.Dev Min Max 
Coupon (%) 5.883 6.000 1.573 0.041 9.625 
YTM (%) 3.844 4.120 1.491 1.073 8.248 
Duration (years) 5.81 4.93 3.67 0.13 18.32 
Years to maturity (years) 7.19 5.87 5.16 0.13 22.78 
Maturity (years) 15.18 13.00 8.45 4.38 35.00 
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Panel D: Non-ORB born corporate bond characteristics  
Total sample (p=70) Mean Median St.Dev Min Max 
Coupon (%) 6.120 6.000 1.445 0.038 9.625 
YTM (%) 3.541 3.645 1.513 1.073 8.248 
Duration (years) 6.17 4.91 4.16 0.13 18.32 
Years to maturity (years) 7.71 5.86 5.97 0.13 22.78 
Maturity (years) 18.65 16.04 8.00 5.50 35.00 
Panel E: ORB born corporate bonds characteristics (36 corporate, 4 supranational, and 1 
international corporate bond) 
Total sample (m=41) Mean Median St.Dev Min Max 
Coupon (%) 5.266 5.500 1.775 1.000 7.625 
YTM (%) 4.651 4.948 1.093 1.475 6.299 
Duration (years) 4.85 5.06 1.47 1.52 7.96 
Years to maturity (years) 5.99 5.91 2.02 1.59 11.21 
Maturity (years) 7.72 7.15 1.94 5.21 15.01 
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Table 2: Characteristics of bond portfolios
Table 2 displays the daily average values for the characteristics of the ORB bond portfolios used in the empirical 
analysis. The ‘Number of Bonds’ gives the number of bonds in a portfolio. The ‘Coupon’ gives the average 
coupon, the ‘Yield’ gives the average yield, the ‘Duration’ gives the average duration, the ‘Years to Maturity’ 
gives the average time remaining to maturity, and the ‘Bid-Ask spread’ gives the average bid-ask spread of the 
bonds in a portfolio. The ‘Investment grade’ portfolio contains bonds with a credit rating of BBB and above, the 
‘High yield’ portfolio contains bonds with a credit rating lower than BBB, and the ‘Not rated’ portfolio contains 
all bonds that are not rated by Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch. Bonds issued by a firm that is not publicly listed, 
perpetual bonds, supranational bonds, and one international bond are excluded from my analysis. I also exclude 
bonds for which data of less than a year (i.e., 250 daily observations) are only available. Further, when a firm 
issues more than one bond, I form a value-weighted portfolio of the multiple bonds whose characteristics I then 
consider to represent the characteristics of the debt issued by that particular firm.  
Characteristic Number 
of Bonds
Coupon 
(%) 
Yield 
(%) 
Duration 
(Years) 
Years to 
Maturity 
(Years) 
Bid-Ask 
spread 
(%) 
All ORB bonds  49 5.912 3.700 5.639 7.366 0.80 
Non-ORB born bonds  34 6.190 3.341 5.540 7.564 0.80 
ORB born bonds 15 5.739 4.339 4.796 5.557 0.80 
Credit quality       
Investment grade (above BBB) 39 5.865 3.240 5.330 7.067 0.70 
High yield (below BBB) 2 6.313 5.901 4.711 5.548 1.60 
Not rated 8 5.481 4.843 6.163 7.815 1.06 
Issue size       
Small issue (<£50 million) 10 5.353 4.362 5.028 5.840 0.81 
Medium issue (£50 to £150 million) 23 5.976 3.227 4.535 5.689 0.71 
Large issue (>£150 million) 16 5.938 3.507 7.189 10.201 0.85 
Time to maturity       
Near maturity: <5 years 22 6.222 2.426 2.756 3.032 0.54 
Middle maturity: 5-15 years 21 5.654 4.406 6.328 7.839 0.90 
Far from maturity: >15 years 6 5.688 4.675 12.679 20.187 1.18 
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Table 3: Characteristics of stock portfolios
Table 3 displays the daily average values for the characteristics of the associated stock 
portfolios. The ‘Return’ gives the average daily return of all firms in the associated stock 
portfolios over the time period examined (i.e., February 1, 2010 to February 1, 2014), 
and the ‘Market Capitalization’ gives the average market capitalization of the bond 
issuers at the end of the examination time period (i.e., February 1, 2014). The ‘Altman’s 
z-score’ gives the Altman’s (1968) average measure of financial distress (z >2.6 indicates 
that a firm is in the safety zone, 1.1 <z< 2.6 indicates that a firm is in the gray zone, and 
z <1.1 indicates that a firm is in the bankruptcy zone). The ‘Total Liabilities/Total Assets’ 
gives the average ratio of the total liabilities and the total assets of the firm.  
Characteristic Market 
Capitalization 
(£millions) 
Altman’s 
z-score 
Total 
Liabilities/
Total 
Assets 
All ORB bonds 26,456 1.91 0.738 
Non-ORB born bonds  36,732 2.09 0.745 
ORB born bonds 9,628 1.44 0.722 
Credit quality    
Investment grade (above BBB) 34,278 1.94 0.777 
High yield (below BBB) 965 0.50 0.617 
Not rated 8,181 2.03 0.648 
Issue size    
Small issue (<£50 million) 11,143 0.90 0.757 
Medium issue (£50 to £150 million) 16,884 1.84 0.699 
Large issue (>£150 million) 53,707 2.08 0.779 
Time to maturity    
Near maturity: <5 years 33,475 2.08 0.738 
Middle maturity: 5-15 years 18,368 1.58 0.724 
Far from maturity: >15 years 39,815 2.15 0.807 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of the daily returns of the bond and the stock portfolios 
Table 4 contains the descriptive statistics for the ORB bond portfolios and the associated stock portfolios. For 
both the bond and the underlying stock portfolios, ‘Mean’ is the average daily return, and ‘St.Dev.’ is the 
standard deviation of the daily returns. The ρB,S is the contemporaneous correlation between the bond and the 
stock daily returns, and ρB,T is the contemporaneous correlation between the bond and the 3-month UK 
government bond daily returns. The p-value of the null hypothesis that the estimated correlation is statistically 
equal to zero is given in parenthesis. 
Characteristic Mean 
(%) 
St.Dev. 
(%) 
Mean 
(%) 
St.Dev. 
(%) 
ρB,S ρB,T 
 Bonds (B) Stocks (S)   
All ORB bonds 
0.011 0.250 0.034 1.015 
-0.318 
(0.000) 
0.006 
(0.836) 
Non-ORB born bonds  
0.010 0.251 0.030 0.991 
-0.316 
(0.000) 
0.006 
(0.840) 
ORB born bonds 
0.015 0.251 0.036 1.180 
-0.183 
(0.000) 
-0.026 
(0.477) 
Credit quality       
Investment grade (above BBB) 
0.009 0.240 0.031 1.024 
-0.337 
(0.000) 
0.017 
(0.593) 
High yield (below BBB) 
0.014 0.780 0.050 2.436 
0.031 
(0.319) 
-0.067 
(0.030) 
Not rated 
0.011 0.456 0.038 1.048 
0.260 
(0.000) 
0.029 
(0.345) 
Issue size       
Small issue (<£50 million) 
0.013 0.306 0.040 1.226 
-0.174 
(0.000) 
-0.055 
(0.112) 
Medium issue (£50 to £150 million) 
0.007 0.219 0.028 0.947 
-0.314 
(0.000) 
0.036 
(0.245) 
Large issue (>£150 million) 
0.013 0.305 0.031 1.008 
-0.283 
(0.000) 
-0.005 
(0.870) 
Time to maturity       
Near maturity: <5 years 
0.005 0.166 0.031 0.962 
-0.291 
(0.000) 
0.040 
(0.198) 
Middle maturity: 5-15 years 
0.015 0.325 0.036 1.114 
-0.278 
(0.000) 
-0.009 
(0.765) 
Far from maturity: >15 years 
0.018 0.493 0.024 1.104 
-0.327 
(0.000) 
-0.014 
(0.663) 
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Table 5: VAR summary statistics for the daily returns of the ORB bond portfolios and the underlying stock portfolios
Table 5 presents the estimates of the following bivariate vector autoregressive model: ܴ௧ ൌ ܽ ൅෍ܾ௜ܴ஻,௧ି௜ ൅෍ݏ௜ܴௌ,௧ି௜ ൅ ߝ௧௅௜ୀଵ௅௜ୀଵ  where ܴ௧ is the variable set ൣܴ஻,௧ , ܴௌ,௧൧′,	ܴ஻,௧ is the daily return of the ORB bond portfolios at time t,	ܴௌ,௧ is the daily return on the underlying 
stock portfolio at time t, and L(= 5) is the lag length. The α is the intercept term, ܾ௜ and ݏ௜ are the coefficient matrices to be estimated respectively, and ߝ௧ is the error term.  The t-statistics of the coefficient estimates are given in parentheses below the estimates. The ‘N’ is the number of observations used in the analysis, and the ‘Granger’ is the F-statistic (p-value in parenthesis) of the null hypothesis that all estimated 
coefficients of the lagged cross-market returns are statistically equal to zero. 
 Lagged Bond returns Lagged Stock returns   
 ܾଵ ܾଶ ܾଷ ܾସ ܾହ ݏଵ ݏଶ ݏଷ ݏସ ݏହ N Granger 
All ORB bonds         1040  
Bond  0.206 
(6.260) 
0.012 
(0.349) 
-0.026 
(-0.776) 
0.043 
(1.316) 
0.052 
(1.608) 
0.032 
(4.159) 
0.039 
(5.028) 
0.022 
(2.754) 
0.008 
(1.029) 
0.015 
(1.869)  
12.626 
(0.000) 
Stock -0.332 
(-2.396) 
0.132 
(0.938) 
-0.188 
(-1.340) 
-0.050 
(-0.356) 
-0.243  
(-1.798) 
0.049 
(1.507) 
-0.019 
(-0.575) 
-0.033 
(-0.982) 
-0.056 
(-1.656) 
-0.039 
(-1.158)  
2.512 
(0.029) 
Non-ORB born bonds                  1040  
Bond  0.209 
(6.374) 
0.021 
(0.636) 
-0.020 
(-0.608) 
0.035 
(1.065) 
0.043 
(1.354) 
0.035 
(4.430) 
0.041 
(5.081) 
0.024 
(2.978) 
0.010 
(1.190) 
0.011 
(1.355) 
 12.881 
(0.000) 
Stock -0.268 
(-1.981) 
0.119 
(0.866) 
-0.187 
(-1.363) 
-0.086 
(-0.632) 
-0.221  
(-1.675) 
0.043 
(1.312) 
-0.050 
(-1.519) 
-0.038 
(-1.135) 
-0.071 
(-2.128) 
-0.038 
(-1.126) 
 2.183 
(0.054) 
ORB born bonds         738  
Bond  -0.021 
(-0.564) 
0.011 
(0.311) 
0.022 
(0.600) 
0.031 
(0.873) 
0.137 
(3.872) 
0.005 
(0.631) 
0.018 
(2.402) 
0.018 
(2.343) 
0.007 
(0.864) 
0.026 
(3.436) 
 5.393 
(0.000) 
Stock -0.041 
(-0.221) 
0.026 
(0.141) 
-0.029 
(-0.156) 
0.053 
(0.301) 
0.088 
(0.493) 
0.068 
(1.813) 
0.036 
(0.954) 
-0.038 
(-1.012) 
-0.016 
(-0.420) 
-0.024 
(-0.635) 
 0.085 
(0.995) 
Credit Rating            
Investment grade         1040  
Bond  0.210 
(6.378) 
0.009 
(0.268) 
-0.005 
(-0.152) 
0.036 
(1.083) 
0.043 
(1.334) 
0.027 
(3.673) 
0.036 
(4.816) 
0.022 
(2.870) 
0.008 
(1.021) 
0.011 
(1.379) 
 10.523 
(0.000) 
Stock -0.296 
(-1.944) 
0.054 
(0.365) 
-0.191 
(-1.301) 
-0.075 
(-0.512) 
-0.257  
(-1.796) 
0.033 
(0.997) 
-0.049 
(-1.481) 
-0.042 
(-1.246) 
-0.062 
(-1.847) 
-0.043 
(-1.272) 
 2.207 
(0.052) 
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High yield          1040  
Bond  -0.121 
(-3.879) 
0.058 
(1.871) 
0.066 
(2.132) 
-0.080 
(-2.617) 
0.009 
(0.280) 
0.008 
(0.855) 
0.044 
(4.489) 
0.030 
(3.022) 
0.026 
(2.633) 
0.005 
(0485) 
 8.718 
(0.000) 
Stock -0.120 
(-1.197) 
0.014 
(0.145) 
-0.045 
(-0.452) 
0.115 
(1.176) 
0.012 
(0.118) 
0.119 
(3.819) 
-0.020 
(-0.652) 
0.016 
(0.494) 
-0.042 
(-1.327) 
0.016 
(0.513) 
 0.646 
(0.665) 
Not rated           1040  
Bond  0.025 
(0.775) 
0.018 
(0.543) 
-0.087 
(-2.704) 
0.053 
(1.653) 
0.060 
(1.864) 
0.021 
(1.488) 
0.020 
(1.443) 
0.020 
(1.446) 
0.014 
(1.010) 
0.021 
(1.496) 
 2.038 
(0.071) 
Stock -0.102 
(-1.371) 
0.095 
(1.286) 
-0.092 
(-1.249) 
0.029 
(0.385) 
-0.052  
(-0.706) 
-0.017  
(-0.530) 
0.069 
(2.137) 
-0.041 
(-1.265) 
-0.032 
(-0.983) 
-0.036 
(-1.128) 
 1.245 
(0.286) 
Issue size             
Small issue (<£50 million)         766  
Bond  -0.007 
(-0.188) 
0.059 
(1.632) 
0.021 
(0.581) 
0.069 
(1.917) 
0.130 
(3.653) 
0.042 
(5.011) 
0.025 
(2.974) 
0.029 
(3.330) 
0.011 
(1.251) 
0.030 
(3.468) 
 13.328 
(0.000) 
Stock -0.052 
(-0.324) 
-0.219 
(-1.368) 
-0.158 
(-0.991) 
0.083 
(0.520) 
-0.072  
(-0.457) 
0.048 
(1.299) 
0.028 
(0.745) 
-0.029 
(-0.760) 
0.017 
(0.439) 
-0.028 
(-0.724) 
0.721 
(0.608) 
 
Medium issue (£50 to £150 million)               1040  
Bond  0.152 
(4.611) 
0.023 
(0679) 
-0.052 
(-1.558) 
0.048 
(1.450) 
0.036 
(1.097) 
0.026 
(3.454) 
0.032 
(4.220) 
0.011 
(1.504) 
0.014 
(1.872) 
0.015 
(1.915) 
 8.224 
(0.000) 
Stock -0.196 
(-1.350) 
-0.004 
(-0.030) 
-0.117 
(-0.799) 
-0.156 
(-1.075) 
-0.242  
(-1.686) 
0.031 
(0.925) 
-0.062 
(-1.884) 
-0.040 
(-1.187) 
-0.076 
(-2.265) 
-0.047 
(-1.394) 
 1.551 
(0.171) 
Large issue (>£150 million)                  1040  
Bond  0.216 
(6.662) 
-0.010 
(-0.287) 
-0.001 
(-0.036) 
0.039 
(1.198) 
0.040 
(1.278) 
0.032 
(3.391) 
0.043 
(4.545) 
0.033 
(3.487) 
0.011 
(1.134) 
0.003 
(0.341) 
 10.584 
(0.000) 
Stock -0.287 
(-2.557) 
0.187 
(1.635) 
-0.208 
(-1.829) 
-0.032 
(-0.280) 
-0.156  
(-1.438) 
0.059 
(1.826) 
-0.028 
(-0.867) 
-0.032 
(-0.965) 
-0.077 
(-2.344) 
-0.014 
(-0.437) 
 2.797 
(0.016) 
Time to maturity            
Near maturity (<5 years)         1040  
Bond  0.202 
(6.242) 
0.005 
(0.159) 
-0.017 
(-0.500) 
0.037 
(1.132) 
0.037 
(1.169) 
0.008 
(1.412) 
0.034 
(6.197) 
0.008 
(1.463) 
0.010 
(1.892) 
0.008 
(1.892) 
 10.098 
(0.000) 
Stock -0.389 
(-2.021) 
0.241 
(1.230) 
-0.508 
(-2.593) 
-0.282 
(-1.459) 
-0.255  
(-1.342) 
0.045 
(1.397) 
-0.050 
(-1.541) 
-0.045 
(-1.380) 
-0.088 
(-2.687) 
-0.023 
(-0.709) 
 3.655 
(0.003) 
Middle maturity (5-15 years)                  1040  
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Bond  0.107 
(3.311) 
0.051 
(1.570) 
-0.015 
(-0.465) 
0.034 
(1.060) 
0.089 
(2.817) 
0.047 
(5.177) 
0.051 
(5.554) 
0.033 
(3.579) 
0.006 
(0.645) 
0.030 
(3.239) 
 17.799 
(0.000) 
Stock -0.245 
(-1.830) 
-0.084 
(-0.727) 
-0.065 
(-0.563) 
0.000  
(-0.004) 
-0.200  
(-1.790) 
0.015 
(0.479) 
-0.012 
(-0.382) 
-0.024 
(-0.735) 
-0.021 
(-0.630) 
-0.035 
(-1.048) 
 2.001 
(0.076) 
Far from maturity (>15 years)                1040  
Bond  0.164 
(4.987) 
0.003 
(0.079) 
-0.048 
(-1.452) 
0.054 
(1.635) 
0.018 
(0.549) 
0.040 
(2.744) 
0.034 
(2.305) 
0.032 
(2.209) 
0.016 
(1.106) 
-0.005 
(-0.340) 
 4.374 
(0.001) 
Stock -0.157 
(-1.905) 
0.062 
(0.818) 
-0.002 
(-0.023) 
0.000  
(-0.001) 
-0.038  
(-0.512) 
0.056 
(1.701) 
-0.023 
(-0.709) 
-0.024 
(-0.733) 
-0.061 
(-1.848) 
-0.021 
(-0.635) 
 1.027 
(0.400) 
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Table 6: Sensitivity of the ORB bond returns to interest rate and market-wide risk 
Table 6 presents the estimates of the following regression models: ܴ஻,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅෍ߚ஻,௜ܴ஻,௧ି௜ ൅෍ߚ்,௜்ܴ,௧ି௜ ൅෍ߚி்ௌா,௜ܴி்ௌா,௧ି௜ ൅෍ߚௌ,௜ܴௌ,௧ି௜ ൅ ߝ௧௅௜ୀ଴௅௜ୀ଴௅௜ୀ଴௅௜ୀଵ  	
where ܴ஻,௧ is the daily return on a bond portfolio at time t; ்ܴ,௧ି௜ is the contemporaneous and lagged daily return of a default-free security (i.e., 
UK T-bill) of the closest matching maturity to the maturity of the bond portfolio; ܴி்ௌா,௧ି௜ is the contemporaneous and lagged daily return on the 
FTSE All Shares index; L is the number of lags and is set equal to 5; ܴௌ,௧ି௜ is the contemporaneous and lagged daily return on the associated 
stock portfolio; ߙ is the intercept term; ߚ஻,௜, ߚ்,௜, ߚி்ௌா,௜, and ߚௌ,௜ are coefficients to be estimated; and ߝ௧ is the error term. The ‘N’ is the number of observations used in the analysis. The p-values of the null hypotheses that the sum of the estimated coefficients is statistically equal to zero are 
given in parentheses.   
  ߙ ෍ߚ஻,௜௅௜ୀଵ  ෍ߚ்,௜௅௜ୀ଴  ෍ߚி்ௌா,௜௅௜ୀ଴  ෍ߚௌ,௜௅௜ୀ଴   F-test N  Adj. R2 All ORB bonds 0.000 
(0.657) 
0.232 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.474) 
-0.154 
(0.007) 
0.176 
(0.001) 
11.317 
(0.000) 
1040 0.186 
Non-ORB born bonds  0.000 
(0.825) 
0.242 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.645) 
-0.118 
(0.045) 
0.149 
(0.016) 
11.052 
(0.000) 
1040 0.182 
ORB born bonds 0.000 
(0.242) 
0.166 
(0.038) 
-0.001 
(0.392) 
0.098 
(0.031) 
-0.035 
(0.323) 
3.385 
(0.000) 
738 0.069 
Credit quality         
Investment grade (above BBB) 0.000 
(0.715) 
0.240 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.522) 
-0.088 
(0.131) 
0.102 
(0.080) 
10.689 
(0.000) 
1040 0.177 
High yield (below BBB) 0.002 
(0.055) 
-0.108 
(0.133) 
-0.004 
(0.050) 
0.348 
(0.000) 
0.028 
(0.342) 
5.316 
(0.000) 
1040 0.087 
Not rated 0.001 
(0.280) 
0.033 
(0.633) 
-0.001 
(0.378) 
-0.209 
(0.001) 
0.118 
(0.053) 
6.454 
(0.000) 
1040 0.108 
Issue size         
Small issue (<£50 million) 0.000 
(0.701) 
0.250 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.932) 
0.073 
(0.138) 
0.046 
(0.213) 
5.332 
(0.000) 
768 0.115 
Medium issue (£50 to £150 million) 0.000 
(0.471) 
0.154 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.312) 
-0.085 
(0.062) 
0.093 
(0.059) 
10.443 
(0.000) 
1040 0.173 
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Large issue (>£150 million) 0.000 
(0.805) 
0.248 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.998) 
-0.066 
(0.316) 
0.092 
(0.154) 
9.418 
(0.000) 
1040 0.157 
Time to maturity         
Near maturity: <5 years 0.000 
(0.309) 
0.211 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.216) 
-0.029 
(0.370) 
0.044 
(0.203) 
9.436 
(0.000) 
1040 0.157 
Middle maturity: 5-15 years 0.000 
(0.915) 
0.214 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.696) 
-0.117 
(0.047) 
0.178 
(0.001) 
9.706 
(0.000) 
1040 0.162 
Far from maturity: >15 years 0.000 
(0.415) 
0.172 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.596) 
-0.047 
(0.563) 
-0.004 
(0.956) 
8.384 
(0.000) 
1040 0.140 
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Table 7: Predictability and profitability
Table 7 reports the profit or loss of the zero-net investment trading strategies based on the bond portfolios that 
are formed by assigning a positive (negative) weight to the bonds whose associated stock achieved an above 
(below) average return over the previous period. The ‘Mean’ gives the average return for the holding period, 
and the ‘Total’ gives the cumulative return for the period February 1, 2011, to February 1, 2014.  
 Holding period 
 Day Week Month 
 Mean 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
Mean 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
Mean 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
All ORB bonds 0.001 1.418 -0.001 0.832 0.001 3.164 
Non-ORB born bonds  0.001 2.289 0.002 1.333 0.003 3.555 
ORB born bonds 0.003 2.920 0.004 2.642 0.003 5.871 
Credit quality       
Investment grade (above BBB) 0.001 1.552 0.001 1.211 0.002 3.090 
High yield (below BBB) 0.002 2.651 0.005 4.678 0.007 8.144 
Not rated 0.004 3.231 0.007 6.213 0.006 7.911 
Issue size       
Small issue (<£50 million) 0.001 1.419 0.002 6. 866 0.005 9.931 
Medium issue (£50 to £150 million) 0.001 1. 399 0.002 6.125 0.004 8.555 
Large issue (>£150 million) 0.001 0.983 0.001 3.569 0.004 7.644 
Time to maturity       
Near maturity: <5 years -0.000 0.703 0.000 1.553 0.003 5.777 
Middle maturity: 5-15 years 0.002 1.770 0.003 4.131 0.004 6.201 
Far from maturity: >15 years 0.002 2.040 0.004 4.798 0.006 7.632 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
